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Tort Law.
Rhode Island Industrial-Recreational Building
Authority v. Capco Endurance, LLC, 203 A.3d 494 (R.I. 2019). The
Restatement rule restricts an accountant or auditor’s liability for
negligence “to those third parties who the accountant [or auditor]
actually knows will receive the information, and then, only for
transactions that are the same as, or substantially similar to, the
ones which the accountant [or auditor] actually knows will be
influenced by the supplied information.”1
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Plaintiff, The Rhode Island Industrial-Recreational Building
Authority (IRBA), an insurer of bonds for limited liability
companies,2 brought a negligence action against Feeley & Driscoll,
P.C. (Feeley), an accounting firm.3 Feeley prepared a 2009 Audit
Report concerning Capco Steel, LLC’s and Capco Endurance, LLC’s
(collectively, Capco) annual financial statements. 4 IRBA asserted
that Feeley negligently prepared the 2009 Audit Report and that
IRBA subsequently relied upon this report when approving a
temporary increase in Capco’s revolving line of credit.5
In February of 2010, there were two separate transactions,
relevant here.6 First, Webster Bank (Webster) provided Capco with
a twenty million dollar revolving line of credit and agreed to make
a six million dollar term loan to Capco by purchasing six million
dollars of bonds from the Rhode Island Industrial Facilities
Corporation. 7 Second, IRBA agreed to insure the bonds up to the
1. R.I. Indus.-Recreational Bldg. Auth. v. Capco Endurance, LLC, 203
A.3d 494, 501 (R.I. 2019) (quoting N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Lapalme, 258
F.3d 35, 40 (1st Cir. 2001)).
2. Id. at 494.
3. Id. at 497.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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amount of five million dollars. 8 In March of 2010, the original line
of credit transaction involving Capco and Webster closed.9 Prior to
closing, Webster provided Capco with its “Summary of Committed
Terms and Conditions” which required Capco to provide Webster
with “annual CPA-prepared, audited consolidated financial
statements” over the course of the term of the loan. 10 In April of
2010, “Feeley issued the 2009 Audit Report to Capco, wherein it
indicated that Capco had earned a profit of $552,000 in 2009.”11
Thereafter, on June 15, 2010, the original bond transaction
involving IRBA closed.12
In early 2011, “Capco sought to extend its revolving line of
credit to twenty-three and a half million dollars for a period of six
months.” 13 In March of 2011, IRBA consented to Capco and
Webster’s request for the temporary extension. 14 In approving the
first credit increase, IRBA asserted that it relied on the 2009 Audit
Report.15 In June of 2011, Capco’s relationship with Feeley ended
and Capco employed a new auditing firm. 16 This auditing firm
indicated that Feeley’s 2009 Audit Report was incorrect and Capco
had lost approximately one and a half million dollars in 2009.17
However, “Feeley [did] not concede that the 2009 Audit Report was
erroneous or negligently prepared.” 18
In August of 2011, a second request was made to IRBA “to
consent to a further extension of Capco’s line of credit to over
twenty-eight million dollars” and “to subordinate its security

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. Capco did not provide IRBA with a copy of the 2009 Audit Report
either at or before the closing on the original bond transaction. Therefore, the
Court was not concerned with IRBA’s reliance on the 2009 Audit Report as
applied to the original line of credit transaction or the original bond
transaction; “IRBA could not have relied on a document it did not have.” Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. This is the first credit increase. “[F]or the purpose of the instant
appeal, [the Court was] concerned only with IRBA’s alleged reliance on the
2009 Audit Report with respect to the first credit increase.” Id. at 497–98.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 498.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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interest to that of Webster.” 19 IRBA consented to both requests. 20
In March of 2012, “Capco failed to make required payments on the
bonds, thus triggering IRBA’s obligation as the insurer of five
million dollars worth of the bonds.” 21
On May 1, 2013, IRBA filed the instant action alleging that
Feeley negligently prepared the 2009 Audit Report. 22 In August of
2015, Feeley moved for summary judgment. 23 In a January 15,
2016 order by the hearing justice, the parties were given until
February 29, 2016 to complete discovery. 24 Thereafter, on October
20, 2016, Feeley renewed its motion for summary judgment, which
the hearing justice granted on March 3, 2017.25 Since the Rhode
Island Supreme Court (the Court) had not yet adopted a test to
resolve the issue of whether a duty exists between an accountant or
auditor and a third party, the hearing justice adopted “the
Restatement approach” and held that Feeley did not owe a duty to
IRBA. 26 On April 10, 2017, the hearing justice granted Feeley’s
renewed motion for summary judgment. 27 IRBA filed a timely
notice of appeal. 28
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Court reviews the grant of a motion for summary judgment
de novo. 29 When considering whether a duty of care exists between
an accountant or auditor and a third party, courts have relied upon
three alternative legal standards: (1) the near-privity test; (2) the
Restatement rule; and (3) the reasonable foreseeability rule. 30 The
Court, in agreement with the hearing justice and the parties,

19. Id.
20. Id. This is the second credit increase.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 498–99.
27. Id. at 499.
28. Id.
29. Id. (citing Newstone Dev., LLC v. East Pac., LLC, 140 A.3d 100, 103
(R.I. 2016)).
30. Id. at 500–01.
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adopted the Restatement rule as its analytical approach.31 The
Restatement rule, in pertinent part, essentially “limits an
accountant’s liability for negligent misrepresentation to those third
parties who the accountant actually knows will receive the
information, and then, only for transactions that are the same as,
or substantially similar to, the ones which the accountant actually
knows will be influenced by the supplied information.” 32 On
appeal, IRBA restricted the focus of its argument to the language
contained in section (2)(b) of the Restatement rule. 33 Therefore, the
issue on appeal was whether IRBA relied on the 2009 Audit Report
“in a transaction [where Feeley] intend[ed] the information to
influence or [knew] that [Capco] so intend[ed] or in a substantially
similar transaction.” 34
IRBA’s first contention on appeal was that the Restatement
rule was satisfied because
it is reasonable to infer that [Feeley] knew when it issued
the 2009 [A]udit [R]eport that . . . Webster and IRBA would
be relying on Capco’s audited financial statements . . .
during the [t]ransaction for the purpose of making business

31. Id. at 501–02.
32. Id. at 501 (quoting N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Lapalme, 258 F.3d 35,
40 (1st Cir. 2001)). The Restatement provides:
“(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment,
or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest,
supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business
transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them
by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise
reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the
information.
“(2) * * * the liability stated in Subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered
“(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit
and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the
recipient intends to supply it; and
“(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the
information to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a
substantially similar transaction.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 at 126–27 (1977) (emphasis in original).
33. R.I. Indus.-Recreational Bldg. Auth., 203 A.3d at 502.
34. Id.
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decisions concerning their respective interests in the
[t]ransaction. 35
The Court rejected that argument because IRBA had essentially
asked the Court to apply the reasonable foreseeability rule. 36
Utilizing the Restatement rule, the Court stated that an
accountant’s liability is limited to those transactions “that are the
same as, or substantially similar to, the ones which the accountant
actually knows will be influenced by the supplied information.” 37
Further, “[t]he accountant’s knowledge is to be measured at the
moment [a report was] published, not by the foreseeable path of
harm envisioned by [litigants] years following an unfortunate
business decision.” 38 Here, Feeley could not have intended that, at
the time the 2009 Audit Report was issued, the report would
influence a future transaction.39 The Court ultimately declined to
expose an accountant or auditor “to the broad scope of potential
liability” that IRBA’s proffered methodology would create. 40
IRBA’s second contention on appeal was that Feeley owed a
duty of care to IRBA under the Restatement rule because the
original line of credit and bond transactions and the first credit
increase were “substantially similar.” 41 The United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit established that “transactions are
substantially similar when the ‘essential character’—the amount
and terms of the credit—has not changed.” 42 A two-step analysis
is utilized to guide the substantial similarity analysis.43 First, a
court must consider, “from the [accountant or auditor’s] standpoint,
what risks he reasonably perceived he was undertaking when he
delivered the challenged report or financial statement.” 44 Here, in
producing the 2009 Audit Report, there was a risk that IRBA would
35. Id. at 502–03.
36. Id. at 503.
37. Id. (quoting N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co., 258 F.3d at 40) (emphasis in
original).
38. Id. (quoting Nycal Corp. v. KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, 688 N.E.2d
1368, 1372–73 (Mass. 1998)).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 504.
42. Id. (quoting N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co., 258 F.3d at 41).
43. Id. at 505.
44. Id.
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rely on the 2009 Audit Report in the original bond transaction. 45
However, the Court stated that “there is no basis in the record for
concluding that Feeley could have reasonably perceived a risk that
IRBA would thereafter agree to extend the line of credit, even
temporarily.” 46 Further, “increasing the line of credit increased the
risk that IRBA would be called upon to make payment on the
insured bonds.” 47 Therefore, the essential character of the
transactions had materially changed between the original line of
credit and bond transactions and the first credit increase.48
The second step of the analysis requires “the court [to]
undertake an objective comparison between the transaction of
which the accountant had actual knowledge and the transaction
that in fact occurred.” 49 Here, although the transactions all
involved a line of credit, the same three parties, and were of the
same “general nature (e.g., bonds),” that “is not enough to render
them substantially similar for purposes of the Restatement rule.” 50
Further, the three and a half million dollar increase in the credit
amount for Capco is not considered a “minor” variance between the
two transactions. 51 Therefore, utilizing the Restatement rule, the
Court concluded that the first credit increase was not substantially
similar to the original line of credit and bond transactions. 52
IRBA’s third contention on appeal was that Feeley owed a duty
of care to IRBA because “Feeley had ‘authorized Capco to supply
information contained in the 2009 [A]udit [R]eport to the parties to
the [first credit increase], knowing that it would be used to
influence [the first credit increase transaction].’” 53 IRBA argued
that pursuant to the terms of the “Professional Services Agreement”
between Feeley and Capco, Capco was required to provide Feeley
with a copy of Capco’s request for the first credit increase before
submitting that request to Webster and IRBA. 54 Within that
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 505–06.
Id. at 506.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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request, Capco included information from the 2009 Audit Report. 55
Therefore, IRBA maintained that Feeley “authorized Capco to use
the information contained in the 2009 [A]udit [R]eport for the
purpose of persuading Webster and IRBA to agree to Capco’s * * *
request [for the first credit increase].” 56 The Court, however,
remained unconvinced 57 because “Feeley did not actively
participate in the first credit increase transaction, and the record
contains no written consent to the use of the information in the 2009
Audit Report.” 58 Further, the Court noted that the “Professional
Services Agreement” referred “only to the publication of any ‘report
[by Feeley] on the financial statements being audited’” and did not
contain any provision requiring Capco to “seek Feeley’s approval for
any possible future use of such a report.” 59 Accordingly, the hearing
justice appropriately granted summary judgment in Feeley’s favor
because Feeley did not owe a duty of care to IRBA. 60
COMMENTARY
Although the hearing justice and both parties agreed that the
Restatement rule was the best analytical approach, 61 IRBA alluded
to the reasonable foreseeability rule in its first contention. 62
Specifically, IRBA argued that it was “reasonably foreseeable that
IRBA might rely on the 2009 Audit Report for another
transaction.” 63 To bolster its argument, IRBA cited the “‘wideranging’ business relationship between Feeley and Capco.”64 Had
the Court applied the reasonable foreseeability rule in addressing
the issue of whether a duty of care exists between an accountant or
auditor and a third party in a negligence action, the Court would
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 507.
59. Id. (emphasis in original).
60. Id. at 508.
61. Id. at 500.
62. Id. at 503. Under the reasonable foreseeability rule, “an accountant
may be held liable to any person whom the accountant could reasonably have
foreseen would obtain and rely on the accountant’s opinion, including known
and unknown investors.” Id. at 501 (quoting Nycal Corp. v. KPMG Peat
Marwick LLP, 688 N.E.2d 1368, 1370 (Mass. 1998)).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 502.
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have exposed accountants or auditors to a very broad scope of
potential liability. 65 For instance, after an accountant or auditor
provides a client with a piece of information, realistically, the
accountant or auditor cannot control “the further dissemination” of
the information.66 Therefore, “[t]he foreseeable class of persons
who can be adversely affected by reliance upon [an accountant or
auditor’s] advice or opinion can be so large as to make liability to
third parties a ruinous and catastrophic kind . . . .” 67 Here, the
Court utilized the Restatement rule in order to protect an
accountant or auditor from a form of third party liability that would
“unreasonably exceed[] the bounds of their real undertaking.” 68
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that, pursuant to the
Restatement rule, the hearing justice did not err in holding that
Feeley did not owe a duty of care to IRBA 69 because: (1) Feeley
could not have known that the 2009 Audit Report would influence
a future transaction; (2) the first credit increase was not
substantially similar to the original line of credit and bond
transactions; and (3) Feeley did not authorize Capco to use the 2009
Audit Report to influence the first credit increase. 70 Accordingly,
summary judgment was appropriately granted in Feeley’s favor. 71
Kerri A. Schulz

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 503.
Id. at 501.
Id. at 503.
Id. at 502.
Id. at 508.
Id. at 495.
Id. at 508.

